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more complete study of the frequent changes in the law which
are constantly being made by the general assembly.
STEPHEN JOHNSON
JOSEPH FRIEDMAN
IS THE MILK BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A
PUBLIC INTEREST?
On June zz, 1933, Governor George White of Ohio approved the
Milk Marketing Act, establishing a Milk Marketing Commission to regulate
the production, and distribution of bottled milk in Ohio. (i 5 Ohio Laws,
page z88, Section ioo, 1-23, Ohio General Code). This Act has been
upheld in a recent Cuyahoga Court of Appeals decision, Clover Meadow
Creamery Co. vs. National Dairy Products Corp. 40 0. L. R. 57, decided
March 26, 1934. In the above case, the defendant sought to have dissolved
an injunction restraining it from continuing unfair business practices in the
sale and distribution of milk. The defendant contended that the questions
of monopolistic control, unfair competition, and price fixing are for the newly
created Milk Marketing Commission to decide. The court of appeals dis-
solved the injunction, and declared the Milk Marketing Act constitutional.
The dissolution of the injunction by the court, on the ground that the com-
mission was the proper body of first instance, upheld the power granted the
commission to decide all issues arising out of the milk industry. However,
if a person or corporation, who is a party to a complaint filed with the com-
mission, is dissatisfied with the commission's ruling, he may by a petition in
error proceed to the Common Pleas court of any county in Ohio. (Section
ioSo-io, General Code).
The Ohio Milk Law was passed as emergency legislation and is to expire
July, 1935, if not renewed. The Ohio Act is similar to the New York Milk
Control Act. (Article 25, 300-3 19, New York Laws 1933). The New York
Act expired March 31, 1934, and has been renewed. The only difference
in the Acts of N. Y. and Ohio, is that the New York Board of Control had
regulatory power over the entire dairy industry, while the Ohio act is limited
to the regulation of bottled milk.
The question arises as to the constitutionality of the price fixing power
granted to the commissions by legislation in New York and Ohio. The
Clover Meadow Creamery Co. v. National Dairy Products, supra, was the
first case in Ohio where the court upheld the regulatory feature of the Ohio
Milk Marketing Act, regulating trade practices. Price fixing power was not
involved, as this point was not raised. The question now arises, if the com-
mission can regulate monopolistic control, and unfair practices, can it also fix
prices of milk to be paid the producer, and the price to be paid by the con-
sumer?
The decision that led the Cuyahoga Court of Appeals to declare the
Milk Marketing Act of Ohio constitutional was Nebbia v. New York 291
U. S. 502, 54-Sup. Ct. 505. The Nebbia Case was decided March 5, 1934.
It was only three weeks after the United States Supreme Court declared the
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New York Act constitutional, that the Cuyahoga Courts of Appeals handed
down its decision upholding the Ohio milk legislation.
The Nebbia Case upheld the New York legislation fixing the retail price
of milk. The Court said that the milk industry in New York was an industry
affecting the safety, health, and public welfare of the people, that the state
could regulate the prices of milk. The Nebbia Case was approved in a recent
U. S. Supreme Court decision, Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, Law Week
Nov. 6, I934, page IO, in which the power of the commission to fix the
prices to be paid to the producer was sustained.
In recent N. Y. cases decided in 1934, contesting the validity of the
N. Y. Board of Control Act, questions have arisen which have not yet been
in issue under the Ohio Law. The courts have upheld the following powers:
z. To fix prices to be paid by the consumer; 2. To fix prices to be paid to
the producer; 3- To allow the Board to investigate any dairy's operations;
4. To revoke licenses for unfair trade practices; 5. To allow "unadvertised"
milk to be sold for one cent less than advertised brands.
But on the other hand the Board has been denied the power to regulate
the price to be paid an out-of-state producer for the raw milk. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U. S. 50z, 54 Sup. Ct. R. 505- 78 L. ed. 563, 89 A. L.
R. 1469; Matter of Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Baldwin, 149 Misc. 902, 262 N.
Y. S. 467; Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 6 F. Supp. 297; 293 U. S.
-; supra; Matter of Bridgeville Farms, Inc. v. Baldwin, 241 App. Div.
781, 270 N. Y. S. 1005; New York Evening Post v. Baldwin, N. Y. L. J.,
June 13, 1934; Borden's Farm Products Corp. v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 352.
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776; Baldwin v. Califon
Farms, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 6, 1934; Matter of Eisenberg Farms, Inc. v.
Baldwin, 243 App. Div.-mem.; Matter of Muller Dairies, Inc. v. Baldwin
243 App. Div.-; Matter of Muller Dairies, Inc. v. Baldwin, 244 App. Div.
-mem.
Section 300 of the N. Y. Milk Law and Section io8o-2, Ohio General
Code, have stated that a continuing evil was becoming imbedded in the milk
industry prior to this legislation. "Inquiries have disclosed destructive and
demoralizing competition, and unfair trade practices, which have resulted in
retail price cutting, and reduced income of the farmer below the cost of pro-
duction." (Quoted from majority opinion in the Nebbia case, supra, page
516). The Ohio Legislature found conditions in Ohio so demoralizing that,
in Section io8o-z General Code, it expressly states, "The production, pro-
cessing, distribution, and sale of milk in this state as a whole, and each of the
said activities or operations, separately, is hereby declared to be a business
charged with a public interest."
To justify the state's creation of boards regulating the milk business,
it must be shown that this does not deny anyone due process or equal pro-
tection of the laws.
It is submitted that fixing minimum prices for milk during the present
emergency, declared by the legislature, is a valid exercise of the police power,
and does not deny anyone due process. The Supreme Court of the United
States had sustained far greater infringements on the rights of contract in
emergencies which were less stringent in their economic aspect, than the
present milk emergency. In Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 29o
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U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. R. 23 (i934). The Supreme Court upheld the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium, by extending the time allowed by existing
law for redeeming real property from foreclosure and sale under existing
mortgages. In Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. R. 298 (1917),
the court upheld the act of Congress fixing hours and wages of railroad
employees in interstate commerce, when a national strike was threatened.
The Supreme Court upheld New York's housing law during the period
following the World War, when an emergency was created due to the short-
age of dwellings. In Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, z56 U. S. 170, 4 I
Sup. Ct. R. 465, (i921) followed by Levy Leasing Co. v. Seigal, 258 U. S.
242, 42 Sup. Ct. R. 269 (1922). Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup.
Ct. R. 458, (1921), the court upheld an Act of Congress fixing rents for
dwellings, similar to the N. Y. Housing Laws. The court said in the latter
case, "A public exigency will justify the legislature in restricing property
rights in land to a certain extent without compensation." The court in
Chicago, M. St. P. Ry Co. v. Hedges, 5 Fed. Supp. 752, (1933), laid down
the rule that, "Laws are merely rules of civil conduct for common good and
must be considered in somewhat the same relation as civil contracts in times
of stress and emergency for common welfare, and in such emergency consti-
tutional limitations 'are elastic to the exercise of legislative powers to avoid
domestic confusion, social disruption, or economic chaos."
Even without the existence of an emergency, the court still would have
had enough precedent to uphold the milk legislation in New York. In 1877,
in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 1i3, 24 L. ed. 77, it was held that grain
elevators were so affected with the public interest, that storage rates could be
regulated. In Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. R. 857,
(1894), the court approved similar regulation of grain elevators in North
Dakota. A Kansas statute fixing the amount of premiums for fire insurance
was held not to deny due process. Getman Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. R. 612, (1914). In Schmidinger v. Chicago,
226 U. S. 578, 33 Sup. Ct. R.-i8z (1913), and Petersen Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 290 U. S. 570, 54 Sup. Ct. R. 277, (1934), regulation of the size
of a loaf of bread was held constitutional.
It has been established throughout the country, that where a business is
a public utility, or has been held a business affected with a public interest,
it becomes subject to regulation and price fixing, as in cases of gas, electric,
water, street railways, and railroad companies. American Digest,-Public
Service Commissions Key No. 7; Constitutional Law Key No. 135; and
Century Digest, Sections 380-387.
Many other decisions have shown that the private character of a bus-
iness does not necessarily remove it from the class of businesses subject to
regulation, and price charges. Griffith v. Conn., ZI8 U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct.
R. 132, (1910); O'Gorman v. Young, 282 U. S. Z51, Cotting v. Kansas
City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79, z Sup. Ct. R. 30, (i9oI), and Stephen-
son v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. R. 181, (1932).
Before the milk legislation, New York and Ohio were having great dif-
ficulty coping with the evils which resulted directly from milk price wars,
and the low returns to the producer. In fact in many parts of the country,
the farmers had struck and refused to ship milk, and also prevented other
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farmers from shipping milk, thereby causing a shortage of milk to the con-
sumers.
In order to insure a daily supply of milk to the consumers it was essen-
tial that the farmers be guaranteed a profit on their investment and labor.
The following states have established boards similar to the Ohio Milk Mar-
keting Commission to remedy the situation which has resulted from cut throat
competition in the milk business; Vermont (Act Special sessions No. 8, 1933
Vt.); New York (Chapter x58, Section 302); New Jersey (Chapter 169,
Laws of 1933); Conn. (Chapter 135, Laws of 1931); Pennsylvania (No.
57, 1933 Laws); California (Chapter 25, 1933); and Virginia (Chapter
357, 1934, Acts of Assembly).
Justices Butler, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Van Devanter, in their
dissent in the Nebbia Case, supra., disapproved price regulation in the milk
business, claiming that the dairyman's business is essentially private. For this
position they cite a dictum in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 26z,
52 Sup. Ct. R. 371, (1932). Their theory of economics is one of laissez
faire, and they back their contentions with many decisions, claiming that
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment means right to contract free
and unhampered by unreasonable legislation. Chief among these decisions
are Tyson Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. R. 426, (927), in
which the court held invalid a law regulating the resale of theater tickets.
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 250, 48 Sup. Ct. R. 545, (1927), in which
state regulation of private employment agencies was held invalid; Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. R. 625 (1923), in which the court
held invalid a statute which forebade teaching in public schools any language
other than English; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S., 51 Sup. Ct. R. 6z5,
(193 1), in which a Minnesota statute designed to protect the public against
obvious evils incident to the business of regularly publishing malicious, scan-
dalous, and defamatory matters was held unconstitutional; Fairmount Cream-
ery v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. R. 5o6 (1927), in which it was
held that the state could not fix prices for purchase of dairy products for
manufacture and sale. Other cases which the dissenting justices stated as
precedents for their doctrine were: U. S. v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S.
81, 41 Sup. Ct. R. 298, (1921); Wolf Packing Co. V. Industrial Court, 262
U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. R. 630 (913), and Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,
278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. R.. 115, (1929).
The dissenting justices in the Nebbia Case, supra., do not find any evil
in the milk business to be corrected and continued to uphold the doctrine
of almost absolute liberty of contract. This is in spite of the fact that at
least 6 ttates have realized the need for regulating the milk business in their
respective states. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has held legislation sim-
ilar to New York and Ohio unconstitutional. Nov. 25, 19 3 4 .- N. Y. Times.
This legislation is primarily to benefit the farmer. The Ohio Act pro-
vides for a combination of producers and distributors to set fair prices, which
will insure the farmer a fair return for his labor and investment. It is
through this method of price control that the people of Ohio are guaranteed
a regular supply of milk at reasonable prices, and the producers are given a
profit on their labor and investment.
The only question remaining is what will the Supreme Court of Ohio,
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and later the Supreme Court of the U. S. do if and when the price fixing
feature of the Ohio Milk Marketing Act is tested? According to decisions
rendered in the Nebbia Case, supra, and Hegeman v. Baldwin, supra., it
seems that the decision in the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals upholding
the regulatory feature of the Ohio Act will be affirmed in the higher courts,
and the price fixing feature will also be upheld.
SEYMOUR ARTHUR TREITELMAN
STATE MORATORY LEGISLATION
Among the deleterious results of the economic cataclysm of 1929, were
the hysterical desire of mortgagors to liquidate their debts and the falling of
property values. To the debtor the situation was most oppressive. To him
it meant that if prices and values fell 5o per cent, the burden of the re-
payment of his debts was increased 50 per cent. To the creditor it meant
securing dollars in payment that would now buy twice as much in commod-
ities. It is the plight of the mortgagor as a debtor with which we are here
concerned. His property was mortgaged to the limit. His outstanding in-
debtedness was in many cases as large as the appraised value of the property.
The mortgagor had three ways of attacking his problem; he might assign
his property to the mortgagee, refinance his indebtedness, or allow the prop-
erty to go by foreclosure. The first two possibilities were often unavailable
or inexpedient and too often foreclosure was the inevitable outcome. But
the pathetic aspect of the mortgage situation was that at the foreclosure sale,
so little was secured that the result was a deficiency judgment hurdled upon
the mortgagor. The greatest factor contributing to this desperate situation
was the fact that there was no market for real estate. The market had com-
pletely disappeared. It was this breakdown of the functioning of our eco-
nomic system that rendered impossible the fulfillment of mortgage contracts.
Under these circumstances our court procedure was ill equipped to meet the
crisis. Our mortgage laws ignored economic forces-fluctuations in price and
property values.
It is estimated that the total mortgage indebtedness of the country
centers about 45 billion dollars, 9 billions of which is on farm mortgages, zi
billions on urban house mortgages, and I5 billions on big building mortgages.'
Foreclosures during the first five months of this year were three times what
they were the whole year of 1926.2 In the State of Ohio alone, during the
first six months of this year we have had 1031 complete foreclosure actions
involving judgments totalling over 5 million dollars.3 That some form of
relief for the overburdfned debtor became necessary cannot be doubted in
view of the crisis. The mortgagors raised their voices to the legislature to
recognize human values even at the cost of going to the "verge of the law."
'Business Week October 27, 1934, page 6.
= Business Week, July, 1934, page 10.
See report compiled by the department of Rural Economics of the State of Ohio
and Ohio State University entitled, Report on Foreclosures, Summary of Year ending
June 30, 1934.
